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Abstract 
 
Reflecting on methodology means thinking about the decisions a researcher makes when 
approaching the subject of study, the questions posed and the concepts embraced. The use of 
any methods should not overlook the epistemological and ontological assumptions underlying 
the selection of a particular methodology, though this is not often explicitly considered. 
Therefore within these considerations, the definition of the unit of analysis and the area of 
study of a research must be made explicit. Answering questions about where a research takes 
place and what or who is being analyzed is necessary for any good research.  
 
The current research on ‘ethnic conflicts’ seems to illustrate the effect of the lack of reflection 
on the previous questions and their implications for rigorous research. Therefore reflections 
about the validity of their findings and the explicit assessment of their methodological 
assumptions (such as the unit of analysis and the area of study) are scarce.  
 
The chapter discusses this through presenting the problems and advantages of using or not 
using ethnicity as a unit of analysis and of using or not using specific regions as areas of study in 
researching civil war. The discussion is illustrated throughout with reflections on how the 
notion of “ethnic conflict” relates to the on-going Colombian conflict. In particular it uses the 
province of ‘El Cauca’ as an area of study to assess the validity of analysis of the conflict as an 
ethnic conflict (where the area of study is local and the unit of analysis a particular group), as 
opposed to the descriptions of the Colombian conflict more commonly given in literature that 
do not mention ethnicity, taking the country as a whole as the area of study and  the most 
salient armed groups in the country as the unit of analysis). 
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1. Introduction  
 
This chapter will seek to address some of the theoretical and methodological claims, debates 
and critiques of research on ethnicity and civil war, or rather, on ‘ethnic conflict’, as they 
appear in the current research that uses quantitative methods (Cederman, Weidmann, & 
Gleditsch, 2011) (Cederman, Rod , & Weidman, 2006).   
 
One of the problems in dealing with ‘ethnic conflicts’ lies in the fact that researchers often take 
the concept of ‘ethnicity’ for granted, not acknowledging how these definitions impact on their 
analysis. This chapter explores  the implications of taking ‘ethnicity’ as a unit of analysis in the 
quantitative studies of civil wars,  and the impact of this on our findings once we change the 
area of study of our research. 
 
To put forward the case for my argument, I analyze one specific aspect of the Colombian 
conflict, pointing out how our understanding of the Colombian civil war could change if we 
change the unit of analysis and the area of study. Taking ethnicity as a unit of analysis will be 
crucial regarding whether what we see happening is named an ‘ethnic conflict’ or not. To 
conduct such an analysis I analyze some of the dynamics of the Colombian violence and reflect 
on the possibility of understanding this as an ‘ethnic conflict’ (i.e. an ethnically- explained civil 
war) and on the role ethnicity plays in this particular violent conflict. 
 
To accomplish this I will reflect on research done on the Colombian conflict that applies 
mathematical models, assessing the unit of analysis used, assessing whether and how ethnicity 
appears therein, and how this affects the claims made on the nature of the conflict in Colombia. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly I discuss the notion of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, 
presenting some of the claims and critiques from the literature on the role of ethnicity in civil 
war.  Then I reflect on the use of mathematical models for assessing conflict and civil war. Then 
I consider the possibility of the existence of an ‘ethnic war’ in Colombia, showing how 
narratives made at national level can differ from regional level narratives and how this is 
related to the unit of analysis we choose. Finally, the document claims that these differences 
and the “unit of analysis effect” are related to ontological and epistemological interpretations 
of ‘civil war’ and ‘ethnic conflict’ that are often not made explicit. 
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2. Ethnicity as a Mirage: Do we want to see ethnicity so badly that we make it real?   
 
The study of the relationship between ethnicity and violent conflict is approached from three 
broad schools of thought: the primordialist, the instrumentalist and the constructivist. Each 
approach deals with three elements at the same time: the definition of ethnicity, the causes of 
conflict, and the role ethnicity plays in specific violent conflicts. Each of them comes with 
different questions, methods and data.  
 
The problems and difficulties with much of the literature about ethnic conflicts can be seen as a 
by-product of the difficulty of embracing intangible and pliable concepts such as ‘ethnicity’ and 
‘ethnic identity’ in relation to violent conflict or war. This is one of the reasons why research 
has given mixed evidence (some of the works proving and others disproving) the impact of 
ethnicity in relationship with violent conflict (Østby, Urdal , Tadjoeddin, & Murshed, 2011) 
(Bramoeller & Jones, 2010, p. 1). 
 
Part of the problem with the study of ethnicity and how it relates to civil war is the difficulty of 
analyzing how ethnicity relates to the general category of war or violent conflict (Bramoeller & 
Jones, 2010, p. 2). This is the case since every conflict affects and will be affected by the identity 
of affected groups residing in conflict areas. The particularities of local contexts will always 
influence the relationship between ethnicity and violence, and the course of violent conflict and 
war, in some way. However, the existence of a relationship between identities and events does 
not mean that identity causes an event. I argue that identities/categories do not cause events - 
analytical categories do not go to war, but can be used to understand war. Units of analysis do 
not go to war, people and organizations do.  
 
As identity can be hardly linked as a causal factor in conflict, efforts to find the archetypical 
model of ‘ethnic conflict’ that explain the role of ethnicity in violent conflicts could be in vain. 
Although there may be evidence of a nexus between ethnicity, economic and social inequality 
and political violence, statistical data have hardly produced evidence for a robust relationship in 
this respect. Rather, most evidence is contradictory and inconclusive (Besancon, 2005, p. 394). 
The questions remain: is this evidence inconclusive because of the methods chosen, the data 
sources relied upon, the methodologies used, or the concepts employed?  Are gaps between 
definitions and empirical evidence unavoidable for war-torn environments? Since scientific data 
and research results have been proven to differ, one possible step towards a deeper insight 
about the relationship between ethnicity and violent conflict could be to analyze the concepts 
and the methods used in research. If research is inconclusive, the problem may lie in the 
methodological decisions made and the “experiment design”; the problem may be located in 
the scientists and their methods, rather than in the object of study. 
 
 One of the problems certainly lies with our very understanding of what ethnicity means. 
‘Ethnicity’ tends to be treated in the primordialist and instrumentalist conflict literature as if it 
were a real, bounded, self-activating social entity, a group with defined boundaries and 
members (Tilly, 2006, p. 524). Varied claims are made in relation to ethnic groups ranging from 
legitimate political representation, to social, cultural and economic grievances on the part of 
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disadvantaged groups subjected to the predatory agendas of states and small cartels of elites 
(Wolf, 2006).  Understandings of how ethnicity can be mobilized among different target groups 
remain quite rudimentary, with ethnic identity sometimes being viewed as a basis for bitter 
conflict, and at other times as no more than an attractive tourism marketing resource 
(Comaroff, 1991, p. 663). 
 
It is clear from research that horizontal inequality can have an ‘ethnic’ dimension (Murshed & 
Gates, 2005, p. 122). This insight can prove useful in understanding structural scarcity and long-
term effects of social segmentation within a society. Ethnicity can thus be an interesting unit of 
analysis for analyzing how development models can create inequality, and thus trigger wars or 
violent conflicts.  Yet ethnicity by itself cannot be said to lead to war (Wolf, 2006). 
 
Ethnic and related identity categories interact in changing environments, and therefore these 
social processes can shift significantly from one decade to another. This imposes major 
analytical challenges on the research of conflict as such analysis implies the study of changing 
categories, contexts and actors in a dynamic a complex interaction (Tilly, 2006, p. 187). 
 
This challenge is evidenced in the struggle of academia to recognize, interpret and understand 
the relationship between ethnicity and violent conflicts after the fall of the ‘iron curtain’. New 
theoretical distinctions were created wherein the use of ethnicity and ethnic identities became 
significant, especially since the appearance of Mary Kaldor’s (1999) work on ‘new’ and ‘old 
wars’, where the ‘new wars’ are characterized as ‘identity wars’, and seen as essentially 
different from the old, presumably ideology-based, wars.  
 
Authors such as Kalyvas (2001)  strongly criticize these arguments on the basis that the actions 
of rebel groups have always been quasi-criminal in their efforts to undermine the strength of a 
state. The fall of the iron curtain changed the understanding of the legitimacy of actions that 
could now be understood as criminal, but which were previously labeled as “revolutionary” or 
“counter-revolutionary”. The implosion of the Soviet Union opened the space for contestation 
to a myriad of nationalities and groups that had been under the yoke of the Soviet war 
machine, and reduced support to states that depended heavily on foreign support. The 
fragmentation of the Soviet State presented the challenge to analysts of how to understand the 
emergence of new conflicts that embraced ethnic or nationalistic agendas.  
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3. Mathematical models, Ethnicity and violence in conflict studies: in search of a unit (y) 
of analysis? 
 
"If you torture the data long enough, it will confess to anything." 
Unknown 
 
 
As mentioned before, the main claim of this paper is that the selection of particular units of 
analysis in relationship to the area of study biases what we can/will ‘observe’, resulting in 
different findings and answers to the questions posed.  
 
In the particular case of research on ‘ethnic conflict’ I suggest that this bias is, among other 
things, a byproduct of the methods and methodologies embraced in research, but not made 
explicit in some cases. This can be illustrated by analyzing the case of mathematical models 
used to research the existence of ethnic conflicts.  
 
First of all a clarification is needed: mathematical modeling can refer to anything that implies 
the use of mathematical equations in order to understand the relationship between certain 
variables. For example, Newton’s law of universal gravitation is indeed a mathematical model. 
In this sense mathematical modeling can comprise an infinitude of applications that make use 
of mathematical equations to understand the existence of ethnic conflicts. Therefore this 
section can be understood as a general assessment of the use of mathematical models that 
research country conflict dynamics through an aggregated analysis.  
 
Mathematical modeling of social phenomena has, by definition, always implied abstraction and 
simplification in order to focus on the understanding of the relationships we want to study 
(Forrester, 2003). In this case, the equations used try to understand interactions; the dynamics 
of these conflicts are represented by interactions between a given set of variables, for example 
the understanding of the state and an “ethnic group” will be modelled through variables such 
as the gross domestic product, the presence of natural resources, the amount of people 
belonging to different religions, etc.  (Gurr & Moore, 1997, p. 1081).  
 
These interactions are understood through equations that “link” these concepts such as the 
state and “ethnic group”. Most of these analyses have embraced a state-centered approach, 
where the variables used to understand the existence of conflict are analyzed at a national level 
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003) (Collier , Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2008) (Bates, 2008) (Cohen, Brown, & 
Organski, 1981) (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010). However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the 
modelling process sometimes takes for granted the leap of faith between the concepts we 
study and the belief that variables represent these concepts we try to study. Is the state the 
gross domestic product? Any serious political scientist would frown to this question. 
 
Because of this a paradox is presented, as the variety of political, economic and social factors 
that can play a role in a continuous process (such as civil war) would have infinite combinations 
of variables to be modeled.  
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Having said this, it is important to note that, as opposed to clinical experiments, researchers in 
the social sciences are and will be left with the absence of proper experiment conditions, but 
with plenty of decisions to make in trying to use science to understand the voluble reality of 
conflict and violence.  
 
On war, ethnicity and datasets 
 
Civil war analyses based on a state centered approach (aggregated data on a national level) 
have difficulties addressing local conflict dynamics. As the case of Colombia will illustrate in 
sections 4 and 5, particular information about a given area can be lost in the exercise of 
calculating an average value of a data at a national level (Østby, Urdal , Tadjoeddin, & Murshed, 
2011).  
 
Several data sources have been employed to approach the realities of ethnicities, the 
comprehension of what ethnic groups are, how are they are mobilized and what causes ethnic 
conflicts. These data sources include the use of health surveys datasets to analyze horizontal 
inequalities and the use of religious affiliation as proxies for ethnicity (Østby, Urdal , 
Tadjoeddin, & Murshed, 2011, p. 379). Language is also used as a proxy for ethnicity. In some 
cases datasets are based on scanned versions of existing maps of ethnic groups, such as the 
Atlas Narodov Mira1, as well as geo-referenced datasets (Cederman, Rod , & Weidman, 2006). 
Also datasets analyzing the political representativeness of “ethnic groups” and the allocation of 
power and resources are used to measure the polarization within the countries (Montalvo & 
Teynal-Querol, 2004) . 
 
In order to be able to compare and analyze the possibility of the existence of patterns, datasets 
aggregate information from different countries, and different years in relationship to the 
variables under scrutiny. A problem that emerges as a byproduct of the aggregation of 
information from different countries is the assumption of homogeneity (that data and 
mechanisms operate in similar ways in different contexts. Lumping together different cases in 
one mathematical model (Badiuzzaman, Cameron, & Murshed, 2011) based on the aggregation 
of national data can have several limitations and consequences. Aggregated studies conceal a 
great deal of information about inter/intra group inequality (Murshed & Gates, 2005), and 
negate the possibility of understanding/considering particular geographical areas, such as ‘El 
Cauca’ (Østby, Urdal , Tadjoeddin, & Murshed, 2011, p. 378). It makes little sense to try to 
prove or disprove highly general theories using inherently different cases in different contexts 
as evidence (Medina, 2008) (Cramer, 2003) (Murshed, 2011). 
 
Literature on ‘ethnic conflict’ studies has shifted from aggregated gross national data, towards 
different units of analysis and areas of study, to assess the particularities of conflicts within a 
geographical (regional) or ethnic perspective (Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009). This shift 
                                                          
1 See http://worldmap.harvard.edu/data/geonode:Naradov_Mira_GREG 
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reflects recognition of the difficulties and the limitations of the existing datasets, and is a step 
in the right direction.  
 
 
Image One. Map of Colombia showing the location of the province of El Cauca (Right) and the demographical 
location of different “ethnic groups” (Left). The spelling mistakes on the categories from the picture in the left 
are from the original datasets, as the labels should be Afrocolombians and Colombians. 
Sources: 
(Right) Municipality of Totoro, Cauca Retrieved on May 15
th
 2013 from <http://www.coha.org/leave-us-in-peace-
security-in-colombias-cauca-department/> 
(Left) GeoEPR-ETH Version 2.0 dataset ETH University. Retrieved on June 20
th
 2013 from < 
http://growup.ethz.ch/pfe/> 
 
Another problem of the aggregation of data is the loss of inter-group variance, which may be 
relevant in explaining cases where ethnic conflict does and does not emerge. Regarding the 
case of Colombia, existing datasets (such as the MAR2 project, or the GeoEPR-ETH Version 
2.0 dataset3) seem to  consider indigenous groups in Colombia as a cohesive and unique group 
operating at a national level; whereas the reality is that Colombia has more than 100 different 
indigenous groups. Other datasets (Uppsala4 or the PRIO projects5) do not even acknowledge 
the presence and experience of groups that fought an armed struggle that could be framed 
within an “ethnic” category, such as the MAQL6 . Therefore, unless we interrogate and validate 
the information we are using, we should not expect to be able to recognize consistent patterns 
                                                          
2 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp 
3 See http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data 
4 See http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php 
5 See http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/ 
6 Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (Quintin Lame Armed Movement), from now on this document, MAQL 
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in information that does not correspond to reality; expecting the models to make sense of un-
validated datasets is disingenuous. The power of datasets is and will be limited to the 
conceptual knowledge of the researchers about the areas they are scrutinizing.  
 
Looking back at the unit of analysis and the area of study  
It is common to observe the presence of models in which findings about war and peace are 
reached apart from consideration of the particular histories and contexts. We should thus 
question the quality of the conclusions from any analysis that separates the study of civil wars 
from their own essence and nature (the political and social conditions that trigger 
confrontation), as conflict is and will be politically and historically rooted (Mahoney, 2000, p. 
84). This is particularly clear in the cases of ethnic conflicts, as shown by the research by Toft 
(2010). 
Ultimately good mathematics and great models cannot correct insufficient databases, weak 
conceptualizations, and bad science. Therefore to advance in the study of ethnicity and conflict 
is necessary to stop, assess our epistemological and ontological assumptions, and check our 
concepts before moving forward. If the experiment is failing we must check our methodology. 
 
Having examined of the use of mathematical modeling in relationship with ‘ethnic conflicts’, I 
now turn to seeing what happens to the analysis of conflicts of today once they are perceived 
as ‘ethnic conflicts’. I propose to conduct a theoretical experiment and to examine the use of 
some mathematical models in the study of the Colombian conflict, looking at both the national 
level and one particular regional conflict within Colombia. I examine the unit of analysis in those 
studies and to what extent the concept of ethnicity is used.  
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4. Colombia is not an “Ethnic Conflict”: The absence of ethnicity at a national level 
 
Taking Colombia as a case of ‘ethnic conflict’ goes against more or less everything that is 
written about the Colombian conflict. But this is precisely why I decided to undertake this 
exercise: to test to what extent our analytical tools can make us blind to, or aware of, the 
realities of a particular conflict. Furthermore, the Colombian conflict offers the possibility of 
making a distinction between different conflicts – and units of their analysis - on national and 
regional / local levels.    
 
The conflict narratives of both Colombia and El Cauca are a case in point. The MAQL, that 
fought an insurgency in the decade of the 1980’s in the province of El Cauca, is a somewhat 
forgotten and unstudied case within Colombian civil war literature and offers an interesting 
example of the emergence of an armed group within a territory that has 21% of the total 
indigenous population in Colombia, but which has never ever been labeled as an ethnic conflict. 
But can our methodological decisions help us produce the ‘evidence’ that can point to the 
existence of an ethnic conflict?  
 
The Colombian conflict has been considered a classic guerrilla warfare conflict (Rangel, 2001) 
where rebels were seeking control of the state apparatus ((IEPRI), 2006) and in some cases 
control of the local institutions (Duncan, 2005).  
 
The history of the Colombian conflict and its emergence can be traced to the impact of 
colonialism (Palacios, 1995)  (Bushnell, 1996). In spite of the fact that independence was 
achieved in 1819, the century that followed was a century where small civil wars were fought 
between liberals and conservatives for the consolidation of power within the country (Palacios, 
1995).  
The tensions and violence lasted up to the midpoint of the 20th century. Throughout this time 
violence was used as part of political platforms and helped to consolidate political power and 
land ownership in several regions of the country (Richani, 2002). The boundaries of 
legality/illegality were framed within those violent political struggles.  
 
Literature often gives salience to a particular episode of this century - an event that occurred 
between 1948-1953, labelled as ‘la Violencia’7. This was an episode in which almost 2% of the 
population of the country died in violence that erupted after the death of a liberal leader 
(Palacios, 1995). However, the practices and logics of violence obeyed the forms and customs 
used more than fifty years before this episode (Sanchez & Meertens, 1984). The eventual result 
of this bloodbath and extended use of violence was a lack of trust in state institutions.  
 
During the period from 1953 to 1958 some of the guerrilla groups demobilized. By 1958 an 
agreement was made by Colombian elites to alternate power between liberals and 
                                                          
7 “La violencia” was a period after the assassination of the Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, in which Liberals and 
Conservatives (the ruling party) 
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conservatives; this functioned to close spaces for any other (non-elite) political power in the 
country ((IEPRI), 2006). This shut down political options for the establishment of new political 
groups and explains, in part, the emergence of the main guerrilla groups in the decades of the 
60’s and the 70’s (the FARC8 and the ELN9). 
 
In the 70’s and the 80’s the appearance of drug trafficking altered the relationships of power at 
a national and regional level, creating space for illegal entrepreneurs, paramilitaries, and armed 
factions who belonged to drug barons and private armies that were known as self-defence 
forces (Duncan, 2005). This complicated the panorama of the Colombian conflict even more, 
indicating that there have existed several simultaneous and interwoven conflicts. In this period, 
a new armed group, the M1910 movement emerged.  
 
The election of President Turbay in 1978 resulted in a government policy against guerrilla forces 
(but not against right wing militants, private armies or paramilitaries) in response to the rise of 
the guerrilla groups in the country. The subsequent employment of security apparatus and 
increased militarization was characterized by human right abuses, use of torture, and 
disappearances11 (Palacios, 1995). 
 
The decade of the 80’s brought a new attempt from the state to reach a peace agreement with 
the guerrilla forces, but this encountered a series of obstacles related to the growth of 
paramilitarism and drug trafficking within the country. The process failed because of the 
opposition to the peace process by right wing and paramilitary groups (Dudley, 2008).  
 
The decade of the 80’s also saw the emergence of small, regionally based guerrilla groups that 
never achieved a national influence, groups such as the MAQL and others. These groups 
emerged as an expression of regional grievances, where armed mobilization became a valid 
option in the face of lack of state presence. The end of the decade was promising: the M19, the 
EPL12 and the MAQL demobilized within a framework of  constitutional reform in the early 90’s 
that fostered the demobilization of some guerrilla groups13.  
 
From 1991 to 1994 the government sought the military defeat of the guerrillas: the intention 
was to defeat those groups not committed to peace. Despite these efforts, results appeared to 
be limited: t drug traffickers appeared to be gaining the upper hand, even with the death of the 
infamous Pablo Escobar and the reclusion of leaders from other cartels. During this decade, the 
leftist guerrilla group FARC and the right wing paramilitaries increased their incomes through 
kidnapping and the taxation of (or revenues from) drug related activities. The lack of state 
                                                          
8 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia) 
9 Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army) 
10 M19 stands for the 19th of April movement, in allusion to the 19th of April of 1970 elections, that where 
labeled as fraudulent, 
11 One of the more controversial measures implemented with this policy was that those accused of extortion 
and/or insurgency would were tried by the military, in martial courts. 
12 Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army) 
13 The MAQL, the M19 the EPL and the PRT. 
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presence in some areas allowed them to increase their military power and effectively replace 
the state in some areas of the country (Leal, 2006). 
 
Despite  the fact that both left- and right-wing armed groups (paramilitaries and guerrillas) 
were growing in size, public opinion reflected a feeling of being  cornered by the leftist 
guerrillas and thus sympathetic with the right-wing paramilitary groups. It is within this context 
that Colombian civil society demanded a reduction of hostilities and another peace process 
became possible. The peace process started in 1998 but failed after four years.   
 
From 2002 to 2010 subsequent governments waved the flag of all-out war (Diaz & Murshed, 
2013). This proved to increase security within the country, which implied a weakening of the 
FARC, accompanied by the death of some of his top leaders. The nation also witnessed a 
dubious peace process with the paramilitaries, as government argued that the peace processes 
emerged as a byproduct of the government’s military strength.  According to the government, 
paramilitaries ceased to exist after the peace process of Ralito (Pardo, 2007), but new groups 
emerged in some areas of the country, such as the BACRIM14  that appeared after the 
paramilitaries were demobilized. These BACRIM adopted the same practices as paramilitaries 
and differed only in name; the process resembled a re-branding exercise, or the collapse and 
replacement of a franchise. 
 
At the same time guerrillas employed a change of strategy, using particular provinces as ‘safe 
heavens’ in order to withstand the government offensive. One of these provinces is the 
department of El Cauca.  
 
But before reflecting on the conflict in El Cauca, I first turn to examine how analysis of all the 
national-level processes discussed above have been conducted using quantitative methods of 
mathematical modeling. 
  
Most of the literature on the Colombian conflict that uses mathematical models has researched 
the conflict in relationship to particular research questions. These questions have ranged from 
the reason for the presence of armed groups (Sanchez F. , 2008), the impact of the internal 
conflict on the economy (Rubio , 1997), the emergence of paramilitary groups and its 
relationship with natural resources (Duncan, 2006), the reasons for teenagers and children to 
join the armed groups (Springer, 2012), the link between governability and conflict (Mason A. , 
2000), the difference between war and criminality (Gutierrez Sanin, 2004), the relationship 
between the conflict and the state (Gutierrez Sanin, 2009), to the role of drugs trafficking in the 
conflict (Vargas Mesa). Having said this, it is important to notice that in none of the current 
research has ethnicity been addressed as an issue that causes conflict or that can explain the 
emergence of conflict; elements such as class, poverty and marginalization of citizens are used 
as elements to understand the presence of armed groups, in conjunction with political and 
historical features (Palacios, 1995). The research that is focused in Colombia as an area of study 
                                                          
14 Bandas Criminales- (Criminal Bands) 
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seems to consistently consider the role of politics and historical elements, as opposed to cross 
country studies (Collier , Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2008). 
 
In all of these studies in Colombia the unit of analysis is the individual or the aggrupation, but 
ethnicity or ‘ethnic identity’ is not used as such to explain the existence of the conflict. It is the 
author’s understanding that there are not any mathematical models that deals with the analysis 
of ethnicity in relationship to the analysis of the emergence of Colombian conflict or armed 
groups. However, the issue of identity groups or ethnic groups is used to analyze the impact of 
the conflict in particular groups or populations (Centro Nacional de Memoria Historica, 2013).  
 
The research that deals with ethnicity and identity in relationship to the Colombian conflict 
does it in a different way as opposed mathematical models approaches to the Colombian 
conflict. The research that engages with ethnicity and identity does not use mathematical 
models, and rather develops an analysis of the historical and political contexts in which the 
MAQL group emerged and acted, and of their relationship with particular indigenous groups in 
relationship to the violence of the conflict in Colombia (Espinosa, 2007) and ‘El Cauca’ 
(Benavides, 2009). It may be possible that, given that the ethnic groups in Colombia are not a 
salient element of the demographics of Colombia given their small share of the population, 
they are simply overlooked, except for historians, political scientists and anthropologists. 
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5. Regional  histories, narratives of conflict and the meanings of ethnicity: El Cauca 
province 
El Cauca is a province in the South West of Colombia (see image two), with a population of 
around a million and a half inhabitants. El Cauca has a long history of struggles for indigenous 
rights, and of the presence of armed groups.   
 
Within this department, 35.7% of the population in the municipalities where conflict is 
prevalent in El Cauca recognizes themselves as indigenous and 54.2% as afro-descendent 
(Prada, 2009, p. 19). In addition, 21% of the whole indigenous population of Colombia are 
concentrated in 14 municipalities of the department of El Cauca (out of a total of 41 
municipalities in the Department) (Peñaranda, 2010). As table 1 shows, the department 
comprises six different ethnic groups with different traditions, cultures and languages. 
 
This presents a scenario where identity-related agendas emerge and are salient elements of the 
local and regional politics in relationship with the Colombian State and the conflict. This 
province had the first indigenous guerrilla group in Colombia (the MAQL) (Benavides, 2009) and 
the indigenous population is constantly endangered and at the receiving end of the violence 
from different armed groups (Paramilitaries, guerrillas and government forces) (Consejo de 
Derechos Humanos, 2010).  
 
 
Table one. Demographical composition of Indigenous groups in the Cauca province in 2012. 
Source: Colombia Opina Blog. Retrieved from http://colombiaopina.wordpress.com/2012/07/28/los-mitos-de-la-
resistencia-indigena-en-el-cauca/ 
 
In recentyears the region has become strategically important for the main guerrilla group in 
Colombia - the FARC - in the face of the government offensive against the left wing guerrillas 
(see image two). The region is also known for the presence of different armed groups thorough 
the years  - the FARC, Paramilitaries, and BACRIMs, the ELN, M19, ELN, EPL, Jaime Bateman15, 
the “grupo Democracia”, el PRT16, MAQL and the JEGA17 (Prada, 2009, p. 17) (Peñaranda, 2010, 
p. 33). For example, the most renowned guerrilla group– the FARC – conducted its first military 
operation in this province, in 1961 (Prada, 2009, p. 63), even before it was recognized nationally 
                                                          
15 A splinter from the FARC in the decade of the 80’s. 
16 Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores de Colombia (Workers Revolutionary Party of Colombia) 
17 Jorge Eliecer Gaitan  
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as an armed group. Other groups also made their presence visible in this province - such as the 
M19, which had peace negotiations with the government in the decade of the 80’s using this 
province as one of its main bases during the peace negotiations.  
 
Historically, these struggles have not been associated with indigenous struggles, except for the 
case of the MAQL. My question here is – can the case of the MAQL struggle and this violence be 
seen as ‘ethnic conflict’? This question comes from the simple fact that Colombian government 
speaks of ‘indigenous groups‘ as ‘ethnic minorities’, and at the same time recognizes different 
ethnic groups within the broad category of ‘indigenous’  (Hudson, 2010). Also the MAQL, for 
example, defined a political agenda around indigenous people’s rights.  
  
In Colombia the dispersion and the separation indigenous groups within the Colombian 
territory by vast distances from big population centres makes them less visible. In the times 
before the colony the population was 100% indigenous; the indigenous population now stands 
at merely 2% of the national population, something that illustrates the extent of the genocide 
and destruction of indigenous groups throughout the years. The indigenous might be seemed 
as something of the past and distant and not belonging to the present and “modernity”. 
Therefore the recognition and definition of them as a group was largely absent before the 
constitution of 1991; after this new constitution they acquired particular legal and political 
tools such as jurisdictional tools and a constitutional framework that recognized the rights of 
indigenous groups and afro-descendants, that allowed them a stronger participation and 
involvement within the Colombian state (Benavides, 2009). However, the literature seems not 
to use the term of ethnic group, and rather refers to them as indigenous groups and indigenous 
minorities. Might it be the case that in Colombia, and even in Latin-America, identity is not 
framed as ethnic, but rather as indigenous?  
 
Equally, if it is true that indigenous struggles have “moved from class-based claims to a politics 
where identity claims have been central in their agenda and part of their strategies to negotiate 
with the state” as a result of the constitutional changes of 1991 (Benavides, 2009, p. 3), why do 
we not call the violent manifestations of those previous struggles in the decade of the 80’s an 
‘ethnic conflict’? I first reflect on some aspects of the regional indigenous conflicts and then 
turn to reflecting on the above questions.  
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Image Two: Intensity of the conflict in Colombia 2010 (Right) and location of the province of El Cauca (left) 
Sources: (left) Wikipedia. Retrieved on June 6th 2012 from 
<http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Colombia-cauca-SIM.svg?uselang=es> 
(right) Vicepresidencia de la Republica De Colombia Retrieved on may 15
nd
 2012 from 
<http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/Observatorio/Documents/Geografia-Violencia/Geografia-confrontacion-
armada-colombia-1998-2011.pdf> 
 
 
Historians have offered a broad account of violence and resistance of indigenous populations in 
the province, showing the roots of the current conflict in the area before the appearance of the 
guerrillas in Colombia. Historically the claims for self-determination (not independence) and for 
respect for indigenous rights date back to the beginning of the 20th century with the uprising of 
1916-1919 led by the indigenous leader Quintín Lame (Peñaranda, 2010). Despite the failure of 
the uprising to achieve its goals, it set a precedent and historical referent of indigenous 
resistance and struggles. The indigenous struggles were also informed by legitimate claims for 
land and for the right to land that had belonged to the indigenous communities for centuries, 
and which was usurped by colonizers and landowners.  
 
Another milestone for those struggles was the formation of the CRIC (Regional Indigenous 
Council of the Cauca- Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca- funded in 1971), a political 
organization aiming at the agglutination of indigenous groups within the province. This marked 
the independence of indigenous political organizations from the main political groups of the 
country (Peñaranda, 2010, p. 31). 
 
The CRIC struggled for  cultural and territorial autonomy of the indigenous guards, as well as to 
recover  stolen lands for the communities and for the defense of the human rights of 
Draft. Please do quote or cite without permission. Version 22nd of November 2013. 
 
16 
 
indigenous communities. These claims were framed within the notion of territory, tradition and 
customs (Consejo Regional Indigena del Cauca, 2013), and therefore can be understood as 
ethnic claims defined by the identity of a particular group.  
 
The emergence of the MAQL presented what could be labeled as an indigenous guerrilla group 
that operated in the department of el Cauca. Its agenda looked to defend the indigenous 
communities of the province from attacks by landowners, other guerrilla movements, the 
military, and other armed groups in the area, as well as to retake stolen territories of 
indigenous communities by landowners in the region.  The group – which was named after the 
indigenous leader Quintin Lame18, did not make separatist claims; it rather emerged as an 
organization in defense of the rights of the indigenous peoples of the province (Peñaranda, 
2010).  
 
The armed conflict of indigenous militants did not last long.  Late in 1980’s the members of the 
MAQL stopped their struggle. In 1991, this group demobilized as part of a broader negotiation 
with guerrillas that gave the country a new constitution, and gave more rights to indigenous 
people, such as a seat in the senate and the right to self-determination (Prada, 2009).  
 
The demobilization of the MAQL did not change some of the realities of the province: the illegal 
economy continued in the region (as a strategic corridor for illicit trafficking) (Prada, 2009), and 
other armed groups such as paramilitaries and guerrillas maintained their presence in the area. 
The amount of combats between armed groups in el Cauca between 1988 and 2009 amounts to 
6% of the total clashes in the Colombian conflict; the province also represents 5% of the total 
battle deaths caused by the Colombian conflict in this period of time (Restrepo, Spagat, & 
Vargas, 2006). 
 
However the mobilization of indigenous groups along ethnic claims has not stopped - it has 
transformed from violent to pacific after the demobilization of the MAQL. One example of this 
is the marches of 2008 led by the CRIC. The marches were a result of grievances related to land, 
human rights, and social and economic policies of the government at national level regarding 
the indigenous population, as well as the signature of a free trade agreement with the United 
States  (Semana, 2008) (El Espectador, 2008).  
 
The marches mobilized around 20.000 to 50.000 indigenous people, who marched from the 
west of the country to the capital Bogota (587 km), demanding the dismantling of law initiatives 
related to the land of their communities, recognition of the death of more than 1.253 
indigenous people since 2002 (to 2007) and of the displacement of more than 54.000 
indigenous people in the Province of El Cauca (El Espectador, 2008). The marchers  also 
demanded the rejection of the Colombian government’s plans to install US military bases within 
the country (Radio Santa Fe, 2008), as well as a response to the impact of mining and industrial 
                                                          
18 Manuel Quintín Lame (1880-1967) was an indigenous rebel from the early 20th century who tried led an 
indigenous movement that attempted to retake the lands stolen from indigenous groups by landowners. 
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projects, as well as armed actors, in their territories (Semana, 2008). The agenda comprised 
elements related to national issues as well as regional grievances. 
 
The mobilization of the indigenous people of the El Cauca could be interpreted as reaction to 
grievances in a community that has often set precedents of pacifist resistance to conflict. This 
pacific resistance is informed by the tradition of the MAQL and the resistance led by Quintin 
Lame (Leon, 2004).  
 
Literature does not refer to the violent manifestations of those previous struggles in the decade 
of the 80’s as an ‘ethnic conflict’. This is because the conflict was never labelled as such; it was 
rather labelled as ‘indigenous’, an ‘indigenous struggle’, an ‘indigenous guerrilla group’, or even 
an ‘indigenous upheaval’. However, if we understand  ‘indigenous’ as a category that refers to 
real or perceived elements that define the identity of a particular group, then the evidence 
presented in this section points to the presence of ethnic violence and the possibility of an 
ethnic conflict having occurred in Colombia during the decade of the 80’s. Therefore the 
violence of the MAQL in the province of “El Cauca” can be seen as a conflict along ethnic lines, 
not directed towards other “ethnic groups”, but rather pursued in defence of the group’s own 
ethnicity and identity against a myriad of actors acting in collision in El Cauca. Furthermore, this 
phenomenon has transcended the use of violence towards the mobilization of these indigenous 
groups through peaceful means, still defending an indigenous agenda - an ethnic agenda in the 
middle of a civil war.   
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6. Towards a Conclusion –Yet not a closure  
 
The question to which I return now is ‘how can we understand the violent aspects of the 
struggles of the indigenous groups in Colombia?’ Clearly, there was an armed conflict: violence 
was used, people have been killed, and the state and specific population groups were involved. 
Could we use the ‘civil war’ framework? It seems not, as the data for the number of battle 
related deaths do not appear in the recognized databases on civil war and conflict (such as the 
MAR19, PRIO20 or Uppsala21 databases), and this kind of violence does not seem to fit the 
‘common‘ definition  of civil war22  (Reid Sarkees). 
  
It seems that the best option within the methodological options offered by contemporary 
conflict studies – one that takes into account the identity-based armed struggles – is offered by 
the concept of ‘ethnicity’. If we understand ‘indigenous communities’ as ‘ethnic groups’ - and 
take them as a unit of analysis as in the case of the indigenous groups of El Cauca and the 
MAQL- much of their struggles could be also seen as ‘ethnic conflict’.  Much of their struggles 
center on the issues of identities and identity-based historical, social and political rights - the 
political agenda of the MAQL, the history of the region and their political organization such as 
the CRIC prove this. Their opponents in those struggles are both the state and other groups that 
encroached on their land and denied them a number of rights, including their self-chosen way 
of participating in the society.  
However this understanding changes if we analyze the case of the violence in Colombia using a 
different unit of analysis and area of study, and focus the attention on the most ‘salient’ groups 
researched in relationship to Colombia’s violence (FARC, paramilitaries, ELN) as opposed to the 
small guerrilla groups such as the MAQL, in relationship to a different area of study, such as the 
province of El Cauca.  
The question then is – why is conflict in Colombia typically described in one way (the former) 
rather than another (the latter)? One could of course note that violent struggles of armed 
indigenous groups are a matter of the past, and that the violence of guerrillas, drug traffickers 
and paramilitaries frame the realities – and the perceptions - of violence today.  Thus, 
indigenous identities are not a party to the violence in Colombia today – even when indigenous 
communities have been at the receiving end of that violence, and in some cases members of 
their communities have been recruited by both the armed groups and the government. 
                                                          
19 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp 
20 See http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php 
21 See http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/ 
22 Their definition of war hinged on two primary criteria: 
1.The threshold of battle -related fatalities of troops in combat, and the status of the war participants (,1000 battle 
-related fatalities within a twelve month period. 
2. The status of the war participants , wars had to have participants on both sides that had organizations  
able to conduct combat (armed forces). Between a state and a group within its borders.  
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Furthermore, the indigenous groups of ‘El Cauca’ have protested against war and have 
attempted to separate themselves from the conflict on multiple occasions (Leon, 2004).  
Is this lack of representativeness in the literature about the Colombian conflict a consequence 
of the racism/oblivion to which indigenous communities have been subject since the colony? Is 
it more legitimate to pay attention to a guerrilla group as opposed to native-revolutionary 
agendas? Is this a consequence of the fact that the total indigenous population of Colombia is 
just 2% of the total population, so that any upsurge by them would have not challenged the 
state to the extent that it would be compelled to recognize them as a threat? Or is this because 
the indigenous groups sought to achieve political settlements, rather than pursue the 
escalation of the conflict and a separatist agenda? 
Thus indigenous struggles, and especially their armed struggles (such as that of the MAQL), 
could easily be seen as an ‘ethnic conflict’, ‘ethnic war’ or an ‘ethnic struggle’, while they could 
not be seen as an ‘ethnic conflict’ as well. This proves the sensitivity of our claims and findings 
to the nature of our methodological decisions, and how being aware of this may change the 
outcomes of our research once we change our area of study and our unit of analysis.   
Consequently, we have to ask: Are the different explanations for the national and regional 
conflicts just a byproduct of academic tools of analysis and theoretical perspectives? Why are 
some of those perspectives more visible than others? And what do we get when we adopt a 
perspective that is seldom taken? What does this imply for conflict studies and the claims we 
make in our research? 
 
This study suggests that those studies that embrace an aggregated perspective in the study of 
civil war that does not consider ethnicity as a unit of analysis will tend to overlook groups that 
have ethnic/indigenist claims and agendas, even despite their making explicit indigenous and 
ethnic claims. By contrast, regional and more localized studies are better placed to consider 
ethnicity as unit of study.  
 
The chances of observing a phenomenon and finding evidence for it are dependent on the 
categories and units of analysis we use. This is true for mathematical models as well as for 
qualitative analysis. This article can be seen as illustrative of selection bias, and of the way we 
drive our research- and our findings - in particular direction as a consequence of our 
methodological choices.  
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